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1. Introduction
Large falls in output  have occurred in 1990  and 1991  throughout  the former socialist  economies
of Eastern Europe. In some instances,  this follows  from a period of sharp prior deceleration  in growth.
In all cases, output decline appears  persistent. It is generally  held that this decline  is closely associated
with the collapse  of the CMEA  trading arrangement  and with contraction  in demand  for Eastern Europe's
exportables  by the former Soviet Union. The apparently  generalized  nature of this negative  shock can
also be seen in other economies--  such as Finland--that  have been closely integrated  with the former
Soviet  Union. The timing and incidence  of these output declines  have, however, been  somewhat  varied.
At cursory inspection,  the scale of output loss has been highest in those economies  that remained until
1990/91 largely centrally planned  systems; Bulgaria and Russia provide the clearest examples.  But in
the two cases that are the subject of this paper--Hungary  and Poland--where  partial reforms and trade
diversification  away from CMEA  partners  had proceeded  furthest prior to 1990, output  decline has been
of large magnitude  and apparent persistence. By end 1991  GDP had fallen by 12%  over 1989  levels in
Hungary and by 20% in Poland. These common  outcomes seem to support a view that emphasizes  the
generalized  nature of the recession.
In this paper, we attempt to distinguish  over those features  that are distinctive  and those that are
general in  explaining the impulse, transmission channels and path of  output decline in  these two
economies.  While it is clear that output losses are massively  concentrated  in the socialized industrial
sectors in both economies,  we pick out significant  differences  in the distribution  of those losses and their
associated  employment  outcomes;  in the timing and degree of synchronisation  of those losses and in the
differential  policy  response  to these  powerful  recessionary  pressures. In particular, we attempt  to separate
out shocks  particular  to a sudden-Polish big bang--rather  than a more  gradual path of reform, as adopted
in Hungary. We do not aim at evaluating  the overall reform program carried out by the two countries.
Our focus is narrower, as we concentrate  on the behavior  of output. Moreover, the nature of the paper
is mainly comparative.  We do not provide an exhaustive, in depth, analysis of  each of the two
economies-analysis which is available in the growing literature on the subject. I  The main objective
of this paper is to draw lessons from the comparison  of two different paths to reform and two different
performances.
Contrary  to initial  impressions,  the contrast  between  Hungary  and Poland is less robust. By 1991
both economies  are characterized  by a practically  fully liberalized  price system, by a high degree of trade
openness  and by independent  central  banks. Despite  broad similarities,  we argue  that there are important
aspects  differentiating  the path to reform followed  by the countries, and that these aspects  are not simply
related to different initial  conditions. Specifically,  we note a clear difference  in what Bruno (1992) calls
the "price shock," and the policies accompanying  it.  In Poland the liberalization  of prices and the
increase in administered  prices were accompanied  by a simultaneous  tightening  of credit policy, and by
a large devaluation  of the exchange  rate.  In Hungary, the "price shock" was diluted over time and was
not  associated with large exchange rate devaluations.  Moreover, the  price level jump was not
accompanied  by a sharp tightening  of credit policy. Important  differences  also relate  to the speed of trade
liberalization, which was much faster in Poland.
The magnitude  of shocks to both economies and the accompanying  macroeconomic  policies
See among  others, Berg and Sachs (1992), Calvo  and Coricelli  (1992), Coricelli  and Rocha (1991),
Dervis and Condon (1992), Frydman, et al. (1990), Kolodko  (1991), Lipton and Sachs (1990).- 4 -
clearly diverged. The role of macroeconomic  policies  can be better isolated in 1990, before the CMEA
shock displayed  its full effects. Interestingly,  in 1990  the decline in output in Hungary was far smaller
than in Poland and was of rather different nature.  It is revealing to note that in  1990 employment
declined more  rapidly than  output in  Hungary,  while lagging output very  sharply  in  Poland.
Consequently,  productivity  increased, albeit  marginally,  in Hungary, while it declined  sharply in Poland.
This suggests  that in 1990, prior to the full impact  of the CMEA shock, adjustment  accompanied  output
decline in Hungary  but not in Poland. Thus, contrary to expectations,  the Polish big bang approach  has
produced LQj adjustment  than the more gradual approach followed by Hungary.  One reason for this
outcome  could be the lack of progress  on the microeconomic  reforms which  has accompanied  the drastic
shift in macroeconomic  policies. However, we suggest  that this result could be also associated  with the
different paths to  reform, namely the big bang and gradualism, followed by the  two countries.
Specifically,  the initial aggregate  shock imparted  to the Polish economy,  by causing  financial  difficulties
across the board might have  produced  the undesirable  result of putting "bad" and "good" firms in similar
conditions. Consequently,  firms might have perceived  that the incentives  for adjustment,  induced  by the
threat of bankruptcy, were not very strong. 2  Indeed, the threat of a wholesale  bankruptcy, involving
a large proportion  of state enterprises, was unlikely to be credible.  Besides  the political implications,
pure fiscal reasons would  have made not feasible  this wholesale  bankruptcy.  3  Paradoxically,  the desired
shake out of the industrial sector, the adjustment  to the new set of relative prices, did not materialize.
The underdevelopment  of financial  markets, with their screening  capabilities,  might have contributed  to
this outcome.  In addition, inherited linkages between enterprises through the interenterprise credit
market, and between enterprises and banks likely exacerbated the problem, increasing the degree of
"noise" in the system.  Soon after the initial scare, firms began increasing wages; moreover, the
employment  adjustment  was modest  compared  to the decline  in output. Credit was increasingly  absorbed
by troubled  firms, as shown by the capitalization  of interest  rates. End-game  behaviors  clearly surfaced,
jeopardizing  the credibility  of the government  program. We  argue  that savings behavior  seems to confirm
this lack of credibility  during 1991.
It is still unclear whether  the different approach  followed  by Hungary  resulted from a deliberate
design.  However. we also note that after a clear difference  in performance  in 1990,  the behavior of the
two economies  converges  in 1991. By the first quarter of 1992,  actually  Poland shows  signs of recovery,
while output is still stagnating in Hungary.
In the paper we discuss several explanations  for the output decline, focusing on both structural
and aggregate factors.  The obvious caveats on the limitations  of official data apply to our analysis.
However, it is doubtful that the ranking of the performance  of  the two countries is the result of
measurement  problems.  Indeed, the underestimation  of second economy, and private sector activities
might be even larger for Hungary than for Poland. 4
2  The lack of adjustment  associated  with the output  decline  in Poland during 1990  was detected  early
on by Frydman and Wellisz (1991).
3  McKinnon (1991) has stressed the difficulties during the transition arising from the fact that
reforming governments  heavily rely on revenues  from state-owned  enterprises.
4  Lado et al. (1991) estimate  that the shadow economy  in Hungary is as high as 30 percent of the
official  one.- 5 -
Structural views have emphasized  two main channels: (1) the closing down of activities with
negative value added, or decline of activities non-competitive  at the new set of relative prices; (2)
downward  adjustment  of output  due to reduction  of "excessive"  inventories.  I Explanations  emphasizing
aggregate  factors have isolated three main features.  The first is the CMEA shock; the second, a the
decline in household demand and the third, a contraction in credit.  The relative importance of the
different factors  varied over time.
With regard to the structural factor we find weak evidence  for both aspects mentioned  above.
However, especially in  1990, there is evidence of a higher degree of structural adjustment in the
industrial  sector in Hungary than in Poland.
With regard to aggregate  factors, the CMEA shock was very strong in 1991 in both countries.
Despite  its popularity, the view based on the exogenous  shift in household  demand  does not appear very
convincing,  especially  when related to the fall in real wages and/or real monetary balances  as the main
driving forces.  Household  demand seems to have been affected by the dynamics of liberalization  and
reforms and the associated credibility of the programs--intertemporal  substitution effects--rather  than
simple exogenous  shifts due to real incomes  or real wealth effects.  The dynamics  of savings behavior
has differed markedly in the two countries, suggesting  a role for the credibility  of the programs, and
attendant  expectations  of devaluation  and reversal of trade reform.  Savings  rates follow a clear cyclical
pattern in Poland, while they increase steadily over 1990-91  in Hungary. The appreciation  of the real
exchange  rate, particularly sharp in Poland, may thus reflect such anticipatory  behaviors  of households
and lack of  credibility of the program, rather than signal a  "misalignment"  constraining domestic
production. Savings behavior  seems to confirm the impression  of a greater credibility  of the Hungarian
than the Polish program.  In this respect, Poland's experience,  especially in 1991, seems to resemble
patterns typical of stabilization  programs in Latin America.
With  respect to contraction  in credit, we find such contraction  to be a major factor explaining  the
Polish recession  of 1990.  6  In contrast, there is little evidence  of a credit squeeze in Hungary in either
1990  or 1991, so that one clear difference  between the respective  country experiences  has been credit
policy.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section  1I reviews the initial conditions  at the outset of the
reform  programs of 1990  and the design  of the programs. Section  1II  summarizes  the output  performance
in 1990/1991. Section  IV we discuss the explanations  for this performance. Section  V reviews possible
sources of persistence  in output decline. Section VI concludes  the paper.
II.  Initial conditions  and the stabilization  proQrams:  Big Bang vs. Gradualism
At the end of the 1980s  Hungary  and Poland had reached  broadly  comparable  stages of economic
reform (Table 1).  The structure and composition  of output was fairly similar.  A large share of prices
was liberalized. Most importantly,  economic  decisions  were largely decentralized  to enterprises. In both
economies,  however, decentralization  was not accompanied  by the introduction  of financial  accountability
5  On the first mechanism,  see Hare and Hughes  (1992), while  on the second see discussion  in Berg
and Sachs (1992), Winiecki  (1991) and Calvo and Coricelli (1992).
6  This view is elaborated in detail in Calvo and Coricelli (1992).-6  -
of enterprises.  Bankruptcies,  although legally contemplated  were not a credible threat, and, de facto
enterprises were still subject to soft budget constraints.  Workers councils were in principle  the main
decisional body inside the firm in both countries.  Both countries were characterized by a share of
industry in GDP extremely high by market economies  standards (Table 1).  Consequently,  the service
.w,ctor  was largely undersized  (see Berg and Sachs (1992)). Within industry, the largest share of value
added  was in heavy industry  (68% in Poland in 1989). The private sector contribution  to non-agricultural
GDP and employment  was relatively  small  in both countries. Total contribution  to GDP was much  higher
in Poland because  of private ownership  in agriculture.  '  The share of CMEA countries  in total trade was
similar in the two countries.  However, Hungary  displayed a much higher degree of openness. Thus,
in terms of output its exposure  to CMEA  trade was almost  twice as large as that of Poland. Hungary and
Poland were also characterized by high external debt to GDP ratios (70 percent in Hungary and 52
percent in Poland).  However, Poland repeatedly  rescheduled  its external debt and consequently  served
a very small proportion  of it. In contrast, Hungary  has serviced regularly  its external  obligations  (interest
payments  at end 1989  was about 5 percent of GDP). Hungary  carried out a fiscal reform and a banking
sector reform 2-3 years before  Poland. However, in the absence  of a change in the underlying  structure
of property rights and microeconomic  incentives,  it is doubtful  that these reforms had a major impact  on
behaviors  and economic  performance.
Despite these common traits, the two economies markedly differed with respect to growth
performance,  the extent of the imbalance in the goods markets and the related inflationary  dynamics.
Albeit increasing, inflation remained at about 20 percent p.a.  in Hungary in  1989, while it reached
hyperinflationary  levels in Poland (Chart 1). This represented  a major  difference  in initial  conditions  and
likely justified a different approach to stabilization.  With respect to output growth, both countries
experienced  a slowdown  at the end of the 1980s. However, Poland went through a major recession at
the beginning  of the 1980s. The output growth after 1982  brought GDP at end 1989  only slightly  above
its 1980  level.
The design of the stabilization  programs was broadly similar (see Boxes 1 and 2), with a
significant  fiscal adjustment, controls on net domestic assets of the banking  system and accompanying
wage policy (see Bruno (1992)). Exchange  rate policy was  slightly  different in the two countries. Poland
pegged  the exchange  rate to the dollar and maintained  a fixed rate until May 1991. Hungary  pegged  the
exchange rate to a basket of currency and announced  that it would have modified the exchange rate to
ensure maintenance  of competitiveness. The programs were continued  along similar lines in 1991.
Is there any major difference  in the design of the programs which would indicate  a significantly
different strategy?  There is a clear difference with respect to the size of the price shocks that each
economy was subjected to  in  1990.  This  resulted from the diverging scale of  adjustments to
administrative  prices and exchange rate (Chart 3).  There is also divergence  with respect to credit and
interest policy where, again, the contrast  between  very sharp or spiky adjustment  in Poland and a more
smoothed  path in Hungary is striking (Chart 3).  An additional  factor compounding  the initial liquidity
squeeze  in Poland was the taxation  of accounting  profits, arising  from the drawdown  of inventories  valued
at historical costs.  This amounted  to a taxation of enterprise inventories  of a magnitude  estimated at
I  However, even  outside agriculture  the private sector was larger in Poland. According  to Grosfeld
(1991) private sector accounted for 5 percent of industrial output in Poland, and for 3-4 percent  in
Hungary.-7  -
about 10 percent of GDP! 8
Finally, despite  a common  pattern of trade opening,  the scale of the initial  liberalization  in Poland
in  1990 was far  more radical than in  Hungary, which pursued an  accelerated but  more gradual
programme of trade liberalization  over the two years.
In short, aside from difference  in the initial conditions, there were non-trivial  differences in
programme  design and implementation. We now  discuss  the implications  for the respective  output paths
in more detail.
111. The output  decline in 1990-1991
The information  we present in this paper is largely based on official  statistics, which, it has been
argued, may overestimate significantly  the output decline. I  However, even the estimates of the
"revisionists"  on Poland point to the presence of a large output decline. While recognizing  the possible
importance of these measurement  problems, the information  available at this stage suggests that the
recession is these countries is not a mere statistical  artifact (see Schaffer (1992).
Both countries have experienced a  sharp recession in  1990-91, so that at the end of  1991
Hungarian  GDP was around 12 percentage  points and Polish GDP 20 percentage  points below the 1989
level (Table 2).  Little sign of recovery can be detected in 1992 in Hungary, and she data on industrial
output indicate a negative  feed-through  from the last quarter of 1991.  Output in that quarter was well
below the average for the year as a whole.  There are however signs of improvement in Poland.
Industrial output increased significantly  in March, and even a stationary output for the rest of the year
would imply a slight recovery for 1992 over 1991.  In April production decline by 4.2 percent with
respect to March, but it was 4 percent above its level in April of 1991.  In addition, for the first time
since January 1990, unemployment  declined  in March. Although extrapolation  from the observation  of
one or two months is not warranted, there are signs that the recession  has levelled  off.
Thus, although  the cumulative  decline  of output in the last two years has been much larger in the
case of Poland, since 1991 the performance  of the two economies  began to converge, and, actually, to
look slightly better in the case of Poland. According  to preliminary  estimates,  consumption  has strongly
rebounded  in Poland--with  an increase  of about 8 percent in 1991  over 1990. As a result, the cumulative
decline of real consumption  in the period 1990-91  was about 9 percent in Poland, as opposed  to about
13 percent in Hungary.  Fixed investments  dropped in both countries around 8-10 percent per year.
Iliventory  behavior has been markedly  different in the two economies. Very little variation is observed
in Hungary, while in Poland about half of the dec,ine of GDP in 1990-91  can be ascribed  to inventory
decumulation. After a significant improvement  in the foreign balance in 1990--much  beyond original
expectations--the  demise of the CMEA  brought a sizable deterioration  of the foreign accounts  in 1991  in
8 See Barbone  (1992).
9  Berg and Sachs (1992) estimate a 7 percent decline in GDP in  1990.  The two main reasons
concern the under-reporting  of private sector activities, and index-type  problems related to changes in
relative  prices (Osband  (1991)). For Poland  there have been attempts  to provide  alternative  estimates  of
the output decline in 1990 (Berg and Sachs (1992)), while  to our knowledge  no attempt  has been made
for Hungary.-8  -
both countries (Table 3).
However, It is worth noting that in 1990,  prior to the main CMEA shock, the output decline  in
Poland was much  deeper than in Hungary, thus sugp%ting  a possibly important  role of macroeconomic
policies. Except for the sharp decline in agricultural  output in Hungary in 1990--resulting  from a severe
drought--the recession in both countries can be described as a recession of the industrial sector, in
particular of the socialized Industrial  sector.  Indeed, private sector production has increased in both
countries (Table 3).  Interestingly,  while in Poland most of the growth of the private sector has come
from retail trade and construction,  in Hungary it has involved  also the manufacturing  sector (see Dervis
and Condon (1992)).
(i) Industrial Output. Employment,  Productivity,  and labor costs
The scale of the decline in  industrial output in the two countries is enormous, although
significantly  larger in Poland.  By the end of 1991  industrial  output was about 30 percent below its level
at the beginning  of 1989  in Hungary, and 45 percent below in Poland. Two main observations  on Poland
arise from Chart 4.  First, the sudden collapse of activity in January 1990 is remarkable.  Second,
employment  decline lags consistently  behind output decline.  In contrast, employment  falls more than
output in Hungary during 1989  and 1990, and only in 1991 it lags behind  the output  decline. The result
is that, in Poland, at the end of 1991 labor productivity  is 30 percent below its level at the beginning  of
1989, while  in Hungary it is only marginally  below. This is a prima facie indication  that adjustment  has
proceeded further in Hungary and that the decline of output could be partly due to a "shake-out"  of the
industrial  sector. This is likely to have implications  for future unemployment. While the unemployment
rate has accelerated  rapidly to over 9 percent in Hungary at end 1991  and to 12 percent in Poland, the
dismal productivity  story in the latter likely implies  higher implicit  need for labor shedding  to eliminate
the accumulated  "employment  overhang."
The behavior of wages was markedly different in the two countries.  Real consumer wages
increased in Hungary during 1990, while they declined by almost 30 percent in Poland (Chart 5).
Striking  is the fact that wages fell below the program ceilings in Poland for the first six months of 1990.
This seems to suggest  that firms faced a severe  liquidity  squeeze  at the beginning  of 1990 . This behavior
is also consistent  with the view of the behavior  of worker-controlled  firms, which likely attached  a high
weight in their utility function to maintaining  employment  (see Commander et al. 1991), and tried to
avoid bankruptcy.
In 1991, real consumer  wages slightly declined in Hungary, while they increased, although  by
less than one percent, in Poland. As producer  prices increased  less than consumer  prices, product  wages
increased in both countries.  At the end of 1991 product wages are in both countries  about 20 percent
above  their level at the beginning  of 1989  (Chart  5).  In Hungary  unit labor costs rose by over 14 percent
over the full two years, with most of that of that increase  bunched  in the latter part of 1991. In contrast,
in Poland unit labor costs at the end of 1991 are 80 percent above their level at the beginning  of 1989.
Apparently, in both countries there is evidence  of wage rigidity, with likely implications  for
persistence  in output  decline. Moreover, wage rigidity poses  a major constraint  on exchange  rate policy.
In the case of Poland wage behavior goes beyond the issue of wage rigidity.  Indeed, there is evidence
of games played by workers against government, with bargaining over tax and other payments  being
intrinsic to those games. One widespread  result is that a large number  of firms have fallen into massive
arrears with the government. In Poland this has primarily  taken the form of arrears on payments  for the- 9 -
excess wage tax.  In Hungary, arrears on general tax payments  are growing in 1992. Chart 6 indicates
that for Poland larger shares  of excess  wage tax in gross profits are observed in sectors with larger shares
of loss making enterprises. Wage behavior  in 1991  has been increasingly  associated  with a phenomenon
of "decapitalization"  of firms (Pinto 1991). The reversal of behavior  from the beginning  of 1990, when
wages were lagging behind  the restrictive  ceilings, is striking.
(ii) Variability  across sectors
Table 4 reports the change in output and other basic variables for eight sectors measured  over
1989.1 at 1990.4 and 1991.4  in Hungary. While it emphasizes  the generalized  nature of the output fall,
it also allows us to isolate a number  of important  differences. First, although  output had already fallen
sharply in the first quarter of 1990 across all sectors, bar food, for all sectors most of the collapse is
spread through 1991. Monthly  observations  indicate  that a sharp increase in the standard  deviation  and
coefficient  of variation  of changes  by sector but little with regard to changes  across sectors.  However,
it is striking  to note that by end-1991  output  of metallurgy  and engineering  were at nearly half the levels
of 1989.1.
In 1990  employment  reductions  generally  match if not exceed the change in output  but, with the
exception  of mining, output in all sectors  declines more rapidly  than employment. The productivity  falls
are sharpest in the two sectors with the largest output  declines. Wages  do experience  downward  pressure
in  1991 in every sector for both product and consumer wages. Even so,  in both engineering and
metallurgy,  despite  huge output  losses  and productivity  declines  of between  15-32%,  real wages  were still
between 10-20%  above 1989.1 levels. Only in food and mining  do unit labour  costs decline; elsewhere
the increase averages over 20%.  Thus while there have been large scale separations in the industrial
sector, it seems likely that insider bargaining power remains significant.  Wage settlements may not
indicate  end-game  behaviour  on the part of workers, but there has clearly  been greater flexibility  in terms
of quantity adjustments--output  and employment--than  on the wage side."'
In summary, the sub-sectoral  data for Hungary show significant  variation in the rate of output
decline, with exceptionally  deep losses in metallurgy  and engineering;  sectors contributing  over 35% of
gross industrial  output value in 1989. All sectors experience  decline  in 1991,  however, and only the food
sector is an outlier.
The behavior of industrial sectors in Poland shows some similarities with that of Hungary.
However,  the timing is reversed: in Poland the output  decline  was across-the-board  in 1990, while  it was
much  more differentiated  across  sectors in 1991. In 1990, 17 out of 20 sectors  suffered declines  of more
than 20 percent (Table 5). "  Table 5 shows that in both 1990 and 1991  the variability  of wages across
sectors is much smaller than that of other variables, such as output, employment  and prices.  It is
apparent from Table 5 that the variability across sectors of the change in output is much  larger in 1991
10  This is partially confirmed  by the powerful  growth in the corporate sector  of assimilated  income
or payments not covered by the wage tax rule; non-taxable  income more than doubled  as a share of the
gross wage bill between 1988  and 1991.
1"  At a more disaggregated  level, Schaffer  (1992) reports results of a survey by the Polish Central
Statistical Office indicating  that 527 products out of 591 surveyed displayed falls of real sales of more
than 20 percent.- 10-
(the coefficient  of variation is more than twice as large as in 1990). As in Hungary, the largest drop in
output takes  place in electro-machinery  and in metallurgy. The role of sectoral shocks, likely associated
directly  and indirectly  with the collapse  of the CMEA  trade, seems to have Increased  sharply. Moreover,
the fact that the hardest hit sectors in 1991 are the same in Hungary and Poland suggests  a common,
"ostructural"  explanation. As discussed  below, electro-machinery  is the sector which was more exposed
to CMEA trade.
IV.  Explanations  for the Output Decline
Several  explanations  have been advanced  for the output  decline. We classify  explanations  in three
groups, which emphasize  the "structural," the "aggregate"  or macroeconomic,  and the CMEA-linked
aspects  of the output decline. Distinguishing  with some precision aggregate  from sectoral or structural
shocks is hardly feasible  with the data currently available. Borensztein  and Ostry(1992)  have applied to
Poland the principal component technique, which could provide a  crude indicator of  the possible
importance  of structural change in the behavior  of output by industrial branches  over the period 1990-
1991. 12  They find that in the case of Poland the first principal component explains 50 percent of
output variability.  We replicate their analysis  for the case of Hungary, finding  that the first principal
component, which can be considered  as an indicator  of the importance  of the aggregate or common
factors across sectors, explains only 35 percent of output variability.  Due to the limitations of the
principal component  technique,  these results should be taken as merely suggestive. Nevertheless,  they
confirm  the more direct observation  on sectoral  variability  of output  in 1990 in the two countries  reported
above, suggesting  that structural change was likely a more important  factor in Hungary.
(i!  Structural $hQcks
Changes in ownership, in the underlying  rules governing  transactions  and non-trivial  changes  in
the trade regime could  be expected  to deliver profound  structural  or reallocation  shocks. This would be
reinforced if ex ante output decisions  were widely  divorced from world prices.  At first approximation,
one might  then expect in the new regime  output changes  to begin  to be governed  by relative price changes
and the composition  of output to reflect increasingly  underlying  viability  at prices closer to international
levels. Aside  from compositional  effects, the extent  to which previous  prices were artificial  and divorced
from comparative  advantages  could  equally  explain  the fall in the aggregate  level of output, as differential
rates of adjustment  by firms to the shock can be generated.
To test the association  of output changes  and viability at the new set of relative prices, we start
with domestic  resource  cost measures  relating  the level of value added at world prices to domestic prices
for 20 branches  of Hungarian  industry  using 1988  prices. 13  For nearly a quarter of total manufacturing
output, including  iron and steel, negative value added was generated; any output loss would therefore
improve welfare. For the remaining  branches  only 7% of Hungary's manufacturing  output  was produced
at domestic resource costs below unity; though clearly this result was very sensitive  to the exchange  rate
level that was used.  For industry  as a whole the DRC was 1.49.
12  Loosely speaking  the higher the variance  explained  by the first principal component  the smaller
is the importance  of structural change or sectoral shocks.
13 The DRCs are taken from Hare and Hughes  (1992) for Hungary, and from de la Calle (1991) for
Poland.Chart 7 gives a plot of these DRCs against the'  change in output for twenty branches 4  There
is clearly a weak correlation between ex ante viability and output changes, but in so far as the DRC
captures  comparative  advantage,  it is clearly a rather poor predictor of relative  output change. Even so,
the largest output losses have occurred In branches with the least comparative  advantage,  particularly
metallurgy.
To explore this possible  association  a bit further, we hypothesize  that low comparative  advantage
would be linked to the share of rouble in total trade and hence to the particularities  of the former CMEA
trade structure. Chart 7 plots the DRCs and the change  in output against  the rouble  trade share in 1989.
For the former, there is no obvious association;  indeed the highest shares of rouble trade are found in
branches  with quite respectable  DRCs. Indeed, for the latter, the picture is a bit different.  The largest
output  losses  are indeed concentrated  in branches  with high rouble  trade exposure;  a point we shall return
to later.
The weaker than expected  association  of output changes with a simple measure of comparative
advantage  is likely to underestimate  the scale  of structural  shocks. First, the data is fairly aggregated  and
masks a  possible intra-branch dispersion in  changes.  Second, there has  been incomplete trade
liberalization with clear lagged effects associated with the timing of trade reforms, the pre-financing
requirement  for imports and foreign competition.
In a context ot price and trade liberalization,  one would also expect that output changes would
directly reflect changes in relative prices and the latter would in turn be associated to comparative
advantage. There have indeed been significant  relative price changes since 1989  but Chart 7 indicates
no evident association between relatives prices and the DRC measure. 1"  A sufficient number of
branches with DRCs at or around unity experience  decline in relative prices.
In the case of Poland the association  between ex ante viability, measured by DRCs and output
and price changes is even weaker than that found for Hungary.  Not only there is no significant
correlation, but the association is not found even for extreme cases (Chart 8).  Indeed, the sector with
the highest DRCs (food processing)  is the one which fared better on a cumulative  basis over 1990-91.
Information  on sectoral output and prices can be explored  further, trying to disentangle  demand
and supply effects on sectoral behavior (see Aghevii  et al. (1992)).  In a simple demand and supply
framework  one would expect that a positive association  between  output and relative price changes  would
signal a shift in the demand curve, while  a negative  association  would  signal a shift in the supply curve.
It is interesting  to observe that a significant,  but weak, positive relation can be found for Hungary, but
that the coefficient does not markedly improve  over more recent sub-periods. For Poland, we find a
negative, though not significant,  relation for the first quarter of 1990. 16 Interestingly,  the correlation
The negative  numbers are for branches with negative  value added.
IS Also, for price changes the first component  only explains 50% of the variability for the period
1989.02 - 1991.12.
16  For Hungary we carried out regressions  for a sample  of 30 branches  over several subperiods. The
coefficients  on the relative  price term ranges between  0.13 and 0.39 and are significant  at the 5% level.
For Poland, regressions  involves 85 industrial sectors for the first quarter of 1990, and 20 sectors for- 12 -
turns positive, and statistically  significant  in 1991. While any robust conclusion  is difficult to support,
this may indicate  some beginnings  of a response  by Hungarian  industry to the new set of relative prices
and associated demand changes.  No such effect seems discernible in Poland in 1990, while it clearly
emerged in 1991.
Another important  structural factor has been identified in the excessive holding of inventories
characterizing  the pre-reform period.  Since Kornai's work (1980), it has been widely believed  that in
shortage  economies  uncertainty  over supplies  and limited  financial  instruments  characteristically  combined
to ensure excessive  inventory  holding,  particularly  of inputs, by firms.  Yet the official  data for 1989  that
we report in Table 6 indicate  that neither country  had excessive  inventories. The inventory  to sales ratio
in both was lower than in the United States.
For 1990  and 1991, it is notable  that in Hungary inventory  changes  are relatively slight. The 30
percent contraction  in Poland in 1990  and the fact that inventory  behavior  contributed  to around 5 percent
of the decline in GDP in both years clearly requires explanation. If inventories  were not at excessive
levels in 1989, however, it seems more likely that this drawing down of stocks was driven by other
factors, such as a liquidity squeeze on firms, rather than indicating further structural change in firm
behavior.
To summarize, there is evidence  of structural change being a significant  component  behind the
output decline in Hungary but that this appears  not to be the case in Poland.
(ii)  Aggregate  Shocks
Aggregate shocks appear to have dominated in Poland at least in  1990.  There has been a
generalized decline in industrial activity in 1991 and this has clearly been closely associated with the
collapse of the CMEA. In this section  we abstract from the latter effect, which is covered  in more detail
in section (iii) below.  Two main types of shock can be isolated:  aggregate  demand shocks and credit
market shocks, working through the enterprise  sector.
(a)  Aggregate  Demand  Factors
The two main channels  identified  as sources  of a shift in aggregate  demand  are the decline  in real
wages and the decline  in real monetary  balances. Real wages  and real monetary  balances--measured  by
official  prices--fell  sharply in Poland during 1990 (by about 30 and 35 percent respectively)  (Chart 9).
No decline is observed in Hungary in 1990.  These factors could thus be relevant for explaining  the
output decline in Poland in 1990.  In 1991, real wages are practically constant in Poland and decline
slightly  in Hungary, while real monetary  balances decline  slightly  in both countries. Besides  conceptual
issues--which  we have discussed  elsewhere '"--concerning  the endogeneity  of both real wages and real
monetary balances,  it is worth noting that the simple demand view should be able to explain why the
reduction  of real wages and real monetary  balances  led to a contraction  in output in 1990,  while constant
real wages--accompanied  however by a sharp increase in unemployment--and  a further decline in real
monetary balances led to a significant  increase in real consumption  in 1991.
1991.
17  See Calvo and Coricelli (1992).- 13  -
The main piece of empirical evidence  provided  by the demand  view for the case of Poland, has
been the increase in finished goods inventories. 18  Berg and Blanchard (1992) show that there Is a
significant  negative  correlation  between  change in finished  goods inventories  and change in sales. '9
One main objection  to this view is that for the economy  as a whole, including  both industry and
trade, finished  goods inventories actually decline sharply at the beginning  of 1990, when most of the
output decline takes place (Chart 10).  The ratio of finished  goods inventories  to sales increases  above
its level at end-1989  only in November 1990. While it is true that finished goods inventories  increase
much  more rapidly in industry--although  they still decline  in January 1990--the  relevant  variable  to assess
aggregate hodfehold demand in relation to aggregate supply is given by total inventories of finished
goods.  20  Moreover, the household  demand interpretation  of the output contraction  is at odds with the
fact that finished goods inventories increase significantly  in  1991, when household demand increases
sharply.
In Hungary  we find that total real inventories  in the economy  and in industry  declined  by between
11-14% in  1990; but in both 1990 and 1991 real finished goods inventories did rise between 18-20
percent (Table 6).  Trade sector inventories, largely composed  of finished goods, fell by around 14
percent in  1990.  Despite the fact that the process was generalized across sub-sectors, there is no
particularly strong correlation  between  changes in inventories  and changes  in output.
Turning to Poland, we find that total inventories  decline sharply in Poland at the beginning  of
1990 (Chart 10).  Despite a recovery during 1990, the ratio of inventories  to sales remain throughout
1990  and 1991  much lower than that at end-1989. The contraction  in total inventories  represents  a large
demand  shock for enterprises. As already mentioned,  it seems more appropriate  to view this contraction
as a result of a sharp liquidity  squeeze on firms, rather than a pure structural adjustment.
Thus, evidence  of a demand-led  contraction  of output is at best weak.  More in general, some
skepticism on the demand-led recession arises from a microeconomic  observation.  Specifically, the
demand view assumes that firms adjust their output in anticipation  of a  decline in demand.  This
interpretation  would depict firms which are essentially  profit maximizers  and are extremely  flexible  and
prone to adjustment. Indeed, in the case of Poland, where the output contraction  took place mainly in
one month, this view would imply an extraordinary capability to adjust to new demand conditions.
Although  mainly a conjecture,  we strongly doubt that firms in reforming  socialist  countries  possess  such
an extraordinary  adjustment  capability. First, maintaining  output levels and employment  is likely to be
a major  concern  for worker-controlled  firms, in which workers  have a stake  that goes beyond  their wage,
including the control on the firm and potentially on its assets.  Second, uncertainties about demand
conditions  must have  been enormous  in an economy  jumping  in one month  from a shortage-economy  state
18  See Berg and Blanchard(1992)  and Berg and Sachs (1992).
'9  It is worth noting, however, that this significant  correlation  is found in a regression  incorporating
credit as an explanatory  variable for inventory changes.  Interestingly,  the credit variable is strongly
significant  while  the sale variable is only weakly  significant.
20  In Poland, like in market economies, most of finished  goods inventories are held in the trade
sector.  Movements  of enterprise inventories are thus affected by changes in demand from the trade
sector, which could in turn depends on a credit squeeze  on trade companies.- 14 -
to a market economy  with free prices. 21  Therefore, it is more likely that demand  factors became  more
relevant over time, when demand uncertainty  was reduced.
More promising  elements  of a demand view which are likely to be relevant in explaining  at least
part of the initial decline in output in Poland in 1990, and the output decline in 1991 in both Hungary
and Poland, can be traced to an intertemporal  substitution  effect and to a real exchange  rate effect.  For
the case of Poland in 1990, an intertemporal  substitution  phenomenon  likely played an important  role. I
In anticipation  of the price  jump households  likely accumulated  inventories  of durable  goods before 1990
and thus reduced their consumption  during 1990.  Evidence of this phenomenon  is the sharp drop in
household  savings at the end of 1989, fo!lowed  by a sizable increase at the beginning  of 1990.
The second aspect relates to a substitution  effect between  domestic and foreign  goods, associated
with the appreciation  of the exchange  rate.  In 1991  real exchange  rates appreciate  in both countries. The
phenomenon  is certainly  more relevant for Poland, where since the beginning  of 1991  the real exchange
rate has been 80 percentage  points above its level at the beginning  of 1990,  or 40 percent above  the level
of the beginning  of 1989. In Hungary, in 1991  the real exchange  rate appreciated  by about 15 percent
with respect to the beginning of 1990.  In both countries during 1991 there was a surge in imports,
particularly  of consumer  goods. Interestingly,  both countries--although  the increase  was much  larger for
Hungary--experienced  also a surge in investment  goods imports. I
The appreciation  of the real exchange  may  be singled  out as a factor constraining  domestic  output.
However, given the endogeneity  of the real exchange  rate, one cannot mechanically  infer from the real
exchange  rate index  a "misalignment"  of the real rate.  In the case of Poland, until May 1991, when  the
exchange  rate was devalued for the first -time  since the beginning  of the program, the real appreciation
resulted from persistent domestic inflation, of the order of 3-4 percent a month on average.  The
persistence of inflation may indicate demand pressure, leading to an increase of purchases of both
domestic  and foreign  goods. As noted  above, this demand  pressure seems to be related  more to changes
in savings rates than movement  in real incomes  or wealth. Savings rates increased at the beginning  of
1990, following  the sharp decline at the end of 1989. The anticipation  of price liberalization  and of the
devaluation  of the exchange  rate likely triggered such behavior.  Savings rates begin to decline in the
second half of 1990, and decline sharply in 1991.  Expectations  of a devaluation,  which actually took
place in May 1991,  and a decline of credibility  of the program likely affected  this behavior. In addition,
anticipations  of tightening of trade restrictions may have contributed to  the increase in  imports of
21  Finished goods inventories  at the firm level were extremely  low before 1990, both in Hungary
and Poland (Table 6). Indeed, in Poland--excluding  the food sector for which inventories  declined in
1990--finished  goods inventories  were equivalent  to 6 days of sales in 1989.  The ratio increased to 10
days in- 1990, an increase of about 70 percent.  This large percentage increase could have arisen from
a forecast  error of about 10 percent on demand, a forecast error which seems more than plausible  for an
economy experiencing  shortages a few weeks before the implementation  of the reforms.
22  See Frydman and Wellisz  (1991), Pinto (1991).
23  Therefore, the negative short term effects on domestic production of the appreciation  of the
exchange  rate should be weighted  against  productivity  improvements  brought  by imports  of capital  goods
from developed  countries.- 15 -
durables. I'  Overall, a diminished &edibility of the exchange rate anchor and of the initial bold
liberalization  of trade, may account  for the observed  behavior  of consumption  and imports. The fact that
exports increase in parallel to imports tends to confirm the view that the real exchange  appreciation  is
the result of expansionary pressures--leading  to  higher domestic inflation--rather  than a  cause for
substitution out of domestic goods in favor of foreign goods. '5  Moreover, the exchange rate
appreciation  of Hungary  could  be related  to the large inflows  of foreign  direct investment,  and thus reflect
an equilibrium  phenomenon  and not a "misalignment."
The above interpretation  has important  implications  for policy  decisions  and near future  prospects
of the two economies. In Poland, especially,  demand and thus imports are likely to decelerate  after the
decline in savings rates.  Overall, the devaluation  of the exchange rate may be counterproductive,  by
making expectations  of actors self-fulfilling.
(b)  Credit Market Factors
Another candidate for the output decline is the contraction of credit, either through quantity
rationing or through interest rates effects. I  Credit market factors seem to have played a crucial role
in the initial output  decline in 1990  in Poland, and may account  for part of the different magnitude  of the
output decline in Hungary and Poland.  The credit view helps explain several puzzling aspects  of the
Polish experience  at the beginning  of 1990, most notably  the wage behavior. As already noted, credit
policy  follows a different  path in Hungary. There is no visible  contraction  of credit during 1990; interest
rates were gradually increased, without mirroring the jump in  prices, either in' 1990 or  in  1991.
Nevertheless, liquidity problems in the enterprise sector emerge during 1991. Enterprise deposits fell
by nearly 20 percent in real terms in 1991, and interenterprise  arrears significantly  increase. However,
the presence of the CMEA shock makes it hard to disentangle  an independent  role for credit factors, as
real credit seems to follow rather than trigger output decline. Looking  at the sub-sectoral  changes,  the
picture is less clear.  Given the generalized nature of the output decline across branches, there is far
greater dispersion in credit than in output. Quite  strikingly, real credit was higher at end 1991  for more
than half the sub-sectors. For metallurgy  and engineering  where output  declines  were the most powerful,
changes in real credit stocks appear to track, with a slight lag, the changes in output.  One possible
measure  of credit restrictiveness  would be to associate  credit to average  variable  costs for 1989  and 1990,
where variable costs comprise  raw material and wage costs.  It is notable  that with the sole exception  of
metallurgy  this ratio actually increased in 1990.  Similarly, relating current credit flows to sales on a
quarterly basis over 1989/91  points to considerable  stability in that ratio both for total industry and the
branches. In sum, in the case of Hungary  there seems to be no clear evidence  of a significant  negative
contribution  of credit on output.
For the case  of Poland  Calvo  and Coricelli  (1992b)  estimate  that liquidity  of enterprises--including
credit implied by credit ceilings for the first quarter of 1990, enterprise deposits carried over from the
end of 1989 and full capacity  profits-fell by almost 30 percent in the first quarter of 1990.
24  For automobiles  there is anecdotal  evidence  of such a phenomenon.
25 The increase in imports  is perhaps a natural outcome of trade opening  and an attendant  increase
in varietv in the consumption  basket.
26  The role of credit is discussed  at length in Calvo and Coricelli (1992).- 16 -
The credit contraction  at the beginning  of 1990  worked  mainly through  the sharp increase in interest rates
which--abstracting  from the price leveI jump of January--reached  10 percent a month in real terms in
February.  Enterprise surveys (Dabrowski et al. (1991) and Pinto (1991)) support this view.  This
suggests that the jump In interest rates provided a powerful coordinating mechanism  for the output
decline; higher interest rates were visible for all firms and signalled--in  a context characterized  by high
uncertainty on costs and demand due to the changes in relative prices--a sharp increase in production
costs. Combined with credibility  of the program, and thus with a perception  of risk of bankruptcy,  the
increase  in interest rates likely induced  firms to scale down their level of production. Sectoral  data seem
to support this view.  As shown in Calvo and Coricelli (1992)  the output decline in the first quarter of
1990 was larger for the sectors with the higher exposure to bank credit.  Furthermore,  sectoral changes
in wages in the first quarter of  1990 are positively correlated with change in credit, suggesting the
importance  of the credit in explaining  the puzzling wage moderation  of the beginning  of 1990.  27
Relaxation  of credit policy through the reduction of interest rates in the second half of 1990,
while it might have contributed  to inflation  persistence, was nevertheless  associated with a recovery in
output (about 9 percent from April to December). Credit policy was tightened  again at the end of 1990
and at the beginning  of 1991. The assessment  of the independent  role of credit in 1991 is complicated
by the presence of the CMEA shock. However, there is some evidence  that credit markets continued  to
constraint  the supply response  in 1991. In this regard, one of the main issues  is the absorption  of a large
proportion of credit by loss making enterprises.  By the end of  1991 loss-making  firms (firms with
negative  operating  surplus)  account  for about  27 percent  of total industrial  sales, while  they absorb almost
40 percent of bank credit.  In addition, non-performing  loans in the banking system, were estimated,
conservatively,  at 30 percent of total loans at end-1991. Thus, a large proportion  of loans--those  going
to loss making firms--are likely to represent capitalization  of overdue interest.  As a result, within the
overall credit ceilings, which include  non-performing  loans, new credit channelled  to the industrial  sector
has substantially  shrunk. Therefore, the difficulties  in the financial  sector are likely to have constrained
the supply response. If not solved they are likely to contribute  to the persistence  of the recession  in the
industrial sector.
(iii) The CMEA Shock
Problems  with the reliability  of the trade data for both countries in 1991  make  precision elusive;
the analysis  in this section is thus tentative.  The  weight of  a  largely exogenous trade  shock in
dampening  foreign demand for Hungarian  and Polish products is widely believed to lie behind the fall
in output in 1991. One might have expected  this to result in change  in the composition  of output rather
than the across-the-board  output losses. But insofar as adjustment  costs are present  and resources cannot
be shifted in the short run to different uses, the CMEA shock would lead to an aggregate decline in
output. Exports to non-CMEA  countries  increased  significantly  in both countries. Indeed, in Hungary
there is evidence  that there was a redirection  of exports from CMEA to non-CMEA  markets, and that
this export growth was not confined  to sub-sectors  already largely exposed  to non-CMEA  trade.  As we
shall see, certain branches  with high CMEA exposure were unable to redirect trade flows, but this was
not a universal pattern.  Consequently,  in both settings increased  exports to market economies  softened
the negative effect of the CMEA collapse.
27  The cross-section  regression  over 85 industrial  branches  yields a coefficient  on the credit variable
of 0.33, with a t-statistics  of 1.9.- 17 -
It appears that for Hungary  total export volume declined  by 10/11 percent over 1990  and 1991,
with most of that decrease occurring in  1990.  28  Given that exports comprised around 38 percent of
GDP in 1990, this contraction  would only account for a direct impact  on output of around 3 percent.
Based on preliminary estimates  of a volume contractions  of 68% for exports in 1991 to former CMEA
countries, the direct effect of the loss of CMEA markets would amount to 10 percent of GDP. 29
For Poland, total exports declined by only 1.4 percent (Table 7).  The effect is consequently
fairly marginal. Isolating  the effect of the decline in exports to the CMEA at around 40 percent in 1991
would nevertheless yield a direct imjact of around 2 percent of GDP.  Incorporating  indirect effects
through input-output  channels  would rise the effect to 4 percent. I
In summary, given the compensation  from the increase in exports to non-CMEA  countries, the
fall in output accounted  for by the fall in exports to the CMEA  leaves a large residual in output  decline
which remains to be explained  in both countries.  However, the negative effect of the demise of the
CMEA might have operated through the terms of trade.
Taking adverse  changes  in the terms of trade, the loss of Eastern markets  and the associated  loss
of rents on exports, Rodrik (1992) has estimated  that the combined  shock accounted  for over 3.5% of
GDP in both 1990 and 1991 in Hungary, and 4 percent cumulative in Poland.  This ignores  any
multiplier effects, but would nevertheless  imply  that roughly  60% of the fall in output over the two years
could be traced to the terms of trade effect of the trade induced shock. "
Prima facie, even after taking into account terms of trade effects, there seems to be a large
residual in the output  decline  to be explained  for Poland, while  the residual appears  smaller for Hungary.
However, we argue that even for Hungary  the residual is fairly large.
One possible supply side effect widely  believed  to have had a negative  effect on output has been
the shift in energy pricing.  This effect was severe in Poland, where firms were paying oil inputs
imported from the Soviet Union well below world prices.  For Hungary, a priori, the argument is less
compelling  as Soviet energy prices were generally at or above spot prices and the import subsidy on
energy was not large, particularly when compared with Poland. 3I  Nevertheless, even for Hungary
2  This is based on final customs data provided by the Ministry of International Economic
Cooperation. Thus, final data would imply a much smaller decline  in total exports than the one reported
in Table 7, based on the first three quarters  of 1991.
29 Indeed, in 1990 the share of CMEA exports in GDP was about 15 percent.
30  This calculation  has been provided  to us by Luca Barbone  of the World Bank.
31  Other estimates, similarly  sensitive to valuation  of transferable  ruble surpluses  and base year
quantities  and prices, indicate major incomes and commodity  terms of trade deterioration  vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union.  Oblath  and Tarr (1991) estimate  an income  loss of around $1.5 billion in 1991  or 4.5%
of GDP, with roughly 20% decline in the bilateral terms of trade.
32  Major items such as gasoline and heating oil were very significantly  in excess of economic  costs
by 1989.- 18 -
weighing  energy price changes  with 1989  consumption  weights indicates  that the relative  price of energy
for industrial producers rose by over 50% in 1990 and by a further 13% in 1991.  For households,
relative energy prices rose by under 3% in  1990 with a further 50% increase loaded into 1991.33
Changes  to energy  prices have obviously  played a role in depressing  profits across sectors in both years
in Hungary.  Highly energy intensive industries--such  as ferrous metallurgy  and chemicals--have  been
negatively  affected,  given  their limited  scope for economizing  on energy inputs. A collapse in enterprise
profitability is observed in Poland since the beginning  of 1991 (Chart 11).
Sorting out and characterizing  the effects of the trade shock on the industrial  sector is complex,
given price and quantity  factors. Nevertheless,  we can identify  a clear loss  of markets  effect on exports.
In Hungary  the compositional  changes--particularly  the decline in capital goods exports--having  obvious
implications  for the sectoral shock.  Second, there is a comparable  effect on the import side.  Capital
goods imports  expand  very significantly,  but most of that is coming from market economies  and can be
considered  part of the structural change  affecting  firm technology. Overall, the sharp rise in imports  in
1991 is concentrated  on consumer  and capital goods from western suppliers. 34 The burst in imports  is
notable  and likely explain  in part the downward  pressure  on domestic  sales;  a point  we emphasized  above.
In Poland a similar pattern can be identified. The sharp fall in exports of electro-machinery--the
sector with largest concentration  of exports to the CMEA--is  accompanied  by a sizable increase in capital
goods imports in 1991  (about  48 percent at end 1991),  following--in  contrast to Hungary--a  fall in 1990
(by 11 percent).  Like in Hungary, imports of consumer goods surge, increasing by more than 100
percent. 3  Thus, the penetration  of imported goods in consumer  markets  has increased sharply.
When trying to trace these shifts down to industrial branches, several features stand out.  As
already mentioned, there is a clear positive association  between exposure to rouble trade and output
change,  particularly  in Hungary  (Chart 8). The association  is present  also in Poland  for the extreme  case
of the electro-machinery  sector.  The latter is the sector with the largest share of exports to the CMEA
over total sales in 1990, and is the one suffering the largest  output decline  in 1991. For the other sectors
the correlation is rather weak (Chart 12).  However, Chart 12 also shows that the contribution  of the
CMEA trade to change in real sales is strongly correlated  with the change in sales. I  Thus, the sectors
experiencing  the larger negative  effects  of CMEA  trade are those experiencing  the larger fall in real sales
in 1991. Nevertheless,  Table 8 clearly indicates  that the CMEA effect is much smaller than the decline
in real sales.  As Table 8 shows, a large proportion  of this gap is accounted  for by the total trade effect.
Given that exports  to non-CMEA  countries  increased  remarkably,  the large negative  contribution  of total
trade is mainly due to the surge in imports. Table 8 suggests  that the negative  impact  on production  of
import penetration  is even more important  than the loss of CMEA markets.
33 By 1991 most energy prices were at or above economic  costs.
I  Giving rise, at the upper bound, to a trade gap amounting  to around 4.5% of GDP in 1991
35  In 1990 consumer  goods imports decline by about 3 percent according to official statistics.
Partner countries  data, however, indicate  that these likely underestimate  by more than 40 percent actual
imports (Berg and Sachs (1992)).
3  The contribution  is defined as the difference  between the change  in real exports and real imports
as a share of 1990  sales.- 19  -
The case of Hungary is similar.  Despite  the CMEA  collapse, foreign sales for industrial  firms
stayed fairly constant in real terms.  It is real domestic sales that shift downwards  the most.  Thus,
despite the correlation  between  output decline and exposure to CMEA displayed in Chart 8, the sectors
suffering  the larger decline  in output  experience  the larger decline  in domestic  sales. The fact that foreign
sales stay up can largely be attributed  to large scale switching  not just into convertible  transactions  but
away from former CMEA markets. Table 4  drives home  the point that foreign sales shares have been
fairly stable and that switching  has been particularly marked in branches with high ex ante exposure  to
rouble markets. I  Plotting output changes  and export changes  by branch for 1991  consequently  reveals
no robust correlation. Thus, sectoral  data confirm  that the loss of foreign markets  has not been the main
constraining  factor on production.  38  The coexistence  of good export performance  and an import surge
should caution however over simple conclusions  on the level of competitiveness  of Hungarian  products.
V.  Persistence  in Output Decline
It is now clear that industrial  output  and employment  has fallen across-the-board  in both countries;
but with deeper troughs in some branches.  Available evidence unequivocally  points to  widespread
difficulty in the firm sector in both countries. Interenterprise,  tax and other arrears (and deteriorating
fiscal positions)  are evidence  of the phenomenon. In Poland, more than 30 percent of industrial  output
is produced by loss-making  firms, and on an after tax basis about 75 percent of enterprises turned in
negative profits.  I  While employment  adjustments  have been sizable, especially  in Hungary, there is
evidence that firms now face a major cost squeeze in both countries.  ;s squeeze  can be traced to a
number  of channels. First, we have already indicated  the resilience  of wages and the rise in unit labour
costs. '4  Second, the significant  rise in the interest rate through 1990 and 1991  and the limited options
for internal financing. Third, the reduction in other subsidies.  "  Fourth, the rise in the relative price
of energy.
Have firms been able to continue passing on cost increases to consumers?  The question is
germane given the  institutionalized  mark-up pricing rule that previously was maintained and the
I The sample  is for larger firms (> 300 workers)  where output  losses  have been higher  than average.
38  A caveat is in order here.  There is clear evidence  that particular branches--particularly  capital
goods producers--have  been seriously adversely affected  by loss of CMEA markets.  But this type of
fixed factors problem has been largely concentrated  in branches  of engineering; transport equipment,
communications  and precision tools are clear instances.  In general, export switching  across payment
medium and trade zones has been very significant in  1990 and  1991; with compositional changes
outweighing  aggregate  export changes
I  There is increasing evidence  that this is also widely  true for Hungary in 1991-92.
0 Hare and Hughes' (1992) estimates indicate  that for Hungary the ratio of labour costs to world
value added for total industry was already rather high at around 0.8 in 1988.
41  Amounting  to over 6% of GDP between 1989  and 1991 in Hungary and 8% in Poland.- 20 -
continuing  high degree of concentration. 42 Trade liberalization  might have been expected to interfere
with the decision rule with downward pressure being exerted on  gross margins.  For Hungary,
unfortunately,  we only have  data for 1990. It indicates  that gross margins  (revenues  minus variable  costs
over costs) for industry and most branches remain constant  over 1989.  For Poland, mark-ups remain
high during most of 1990, although below their level at end-1989, and decline sharply in 1991.
Overall, the partial picture we have pieced together indicates  significant  rigidity on the cost side
in both countries; in part the consequence  of price shocks and fixed production  coefficients;  in part the
result  of Insider  bargaining  power on the part of workers. These  factors  are likely to promote  persistence
in  output and  inflation.  Rigidities on  wages will also jeopardize the  needed improvement in
competitiveness  in both countries.
The accumulation  of inventories  of finished  goods  is an additional  source of persistence  in output.
If current levels  of inventories  are higher than  desired, output  recovery  will have to wait  for the reduction
of finished  goods inventories  to their desired  level. From the discussion  above, there is some uncertainty
on the assessment  of the level of finished  goods inventories  due to the extremely  low starting point  before
1990.
Beyond these macroeconomic  factors, a major uncertainty  on the prospects for recovery output
comes  from the structural transformations,  in primis  the process  of privatization,  in the two economies.
Especially in Poland the uncertainty on the reform of the enterprise sector has created a paralyzing
situation with loss-making  firms Involved  in a clear end-game  with the government. The noise created
by the interconnections  among enterprises  through interfirm  debts, and between  enterprises and banks,
is a major bottleneck  for an effective  supply response  of the economy. While this process is not as far
advanced  in Hungary as in Poland, it is clear that a signific'ant  section  of the socialized  firm sector is loss
making and/or  in  strategic decline.  The  potential for  end-game behavior in  the  face of  low
competitiveness,  an absence of wage controls (since January 1992) and continuing uncertainty  over
ownership  remains present.
VI.  Concluding  Remarks
The decline of output in  1990-91 has been enormous for  both economies.  However, the
magnitude  of the decline has been much larger in the case of Poland, despite a smaller impact of the
demise of the CMEA.  More importantly,  the decline  of output in Hungary seems to be associated  to a
larger extent than in Poland to structural change. For both countries  the recession  has been a recession
of the state sector.  The pace of privatization  and private sector growth may be too slow in both
economies. This may prove to be the main constraint  on output growth in both countries. Nevertheless,
there are also macroeconomic  constraints  on output  expansion.  These  seem  to be associated  with two main
factors: (i) credit market imperfections;  (ii) increase in labor costs.  The large share of non-performing
loans in both countries, and the interconnections  among enterprises  through interenterprise  credit pose
major constraints  on an efficient  allocation  of resources. Wage  behavior, especially  in Poland, indicates
the presence of end-game  behaviors and decapitalization  of firms.  Signs of wage rigidity seem present
also in Hungary.  A major question  mark is associated  with the dynamics  of wages which may arise as
a result of the receht lifting of eontrols  on wages in state enterprises.
4"  In 1988  barely 21 % of total supply in product  markets for manufactured  goods could be classed
as coinpetitive,  see Landesmann  ahd Szekely  (1991).- 21 -
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Box 1
The Hungarian  Programmes  for 1990 and 1991
In both years  the Hungarian  Government  had agreements  with the IMF and with the
World  Bank. The agreements  targetted  significant  fiscal adjustment  - 2 percentage  points  of
GDP in 1990  -,  reductions  in real  net domestic  assets  and money,  an increase  and subsequent
maintenance  of interest rates at or near positive real rates, the continued  liberalization  of
consumer  and producer  prices, including  energy  prices, as well  as nominal  depreciation  of the
exchange  rate, 15% in 1990. More  structural  components  included  measures  for accelerating
privatisation,  for the reduction  of subsidies  to enterprises  and for increased  trade liberalization.
In both 1990 and 1991  there was general compliance  with targets set under these
agreements,  particularly  with respect  to monetary  indicators,  subsidies  and trade policy.  Of
note, is the consistently  far stronger  than projected  performance  of the convertible  current
account. By contrast, implicit  or explicit  targets for growth, inflation  and the budget  have
proven grosslv  optimistic.
Projected  and Actual  Outcomes
(percent  changes unless  indicated)
1990  1991
Projected  Actual  Projected  Actual
GDP  -1.9  4.0  -3.0  -7.5
Consumer  Prices  20.0  28.9  31.0  35.0
Budget  Balance
(% of GDP)  0.6  0.4  -1.4  4.3
Current  Account
Convertible  ( %  -1.3  0.4  -3.6  1.0
of GDP)
Subsidies  (%
of GDP)  9.0  9.4  i  7.0  7.0
Real Domestic
Assets  -9.4  -14.6  -13.5  -18.3
Real  Broad  Money  -3.2  0.2  -6.0  -5.0
Interest  Rate  21.6  24.4  30.0  31.3
Wng-'  Bill(real)  .6.0  4.5  -6.0  -5.0
Imporn
Liberalization'  32.0  37.0  72.0  72.0
(5=estimate.  *  production  weights)-24-
BoX  2
The Poish  Programmes  for 1990 and 1991
In both years the Polish Governemnt  had agreements  with the IMF and the World Bank.
The agreements targetted a signgificant  fiscal adjustment in 1990 (about 6 percent of GDP) and
a small deficit for  1991.  Real net domestic assets were  expected to  grow in  both years,
although a decline was expected  for the first quarter of 1990.  Interest rates were meant to be
positive in real terms.  The exchange  rate was devalued by more than 30 percent and then fixedl
in relation to the U.S.  dollar 1990, while it moved to a crawling peg (related to a basket of
currencies) after May  1991.  Wage increases were subject to ceilings, determined by low
indexation  coefficients.  The wage bill was subject to control in 1990 and the wage per worker
in 1991. The private sector was exempted  from controls in 1991. Most prices were liberalized
in 1990. At the beginning of 1990  almost all quantitative restrictions on trade were eliminated.
All commercial imports were subject to  an ad valorem tariff (for most-favored-nations 8.9
percent on average at the beginning, reduced to 4 percent in May 1990).  In 1990 there was
general compliance with targets.  Actually, the improvement in the budget and in the current
account of  the balance of payments was much stronger than targetted.  Targets  were not
complied with in  1991.  In both years, targets for growth and inflation have proven grossly
optimistic.  On the structural front, the privatization program did  not  proceed as  fast as
programmed.  Only, at the end of 1991  a mass-privatization  program was approved.
Projected and Actual Outcomes
(percent changes unless otherwise indicated)
1990  1991
Projected  Actual  Projected  Actual
GDP  -5.0  -11.9  3.0  -8.0
Consumer Pricesl/  94.0  249.0  36.0  60.0
Budget  Balance  4.3
(% of GDP)  -0.1  2.5  -0.6
Current Account  -1.8
(% of GDP)  -7.1  1.0  -2.8  -1.8
Real Net Domestic
Assets  15.0  -60.0  22.0  14;0
Real Broad Monev  4.0  -37.5  3.0  -7.0
Real Wages  -31.0  -30.0  4.0  3.0
I/ December  to December  change-25-
Table.  I 




Manufacturing  and Construction  41.9%  50.7%
Agriculture  16.2%  12.2%
Services  41.9%  37.1%
of which;
Private  Sector  c.15%  28.4%
Employment:
Manufacturing and Construction  37.5%  35.3%
Agriculture  17.3%  28.5%
Services  45.2%  36.2%
of  which;
Private Sector  7.8%  47.2%
Trade Direction:
Shares in Exports;
Convertible Currency  62.2%  67.0%
Rouble  37.8%  33.0%
of which, USSR  59.9%  58.6%
Shares in Imports;
Convertible Currency  61.6%  69.0%
Rouble  38.4%  31.0%
of which, USSR  56.5%  55.9%
Openness  ((Exports+Imports)/GDP)  63.3%  34.0%
Prices Controls;
Share of Free Consumer  Prices  83.0%  66.0%-26-
Table 2
HUngary  and Poland:  Change in GDP and Its Components, 1990191
Hungary  Poland  Hungary  Poland
GDP  -4.0  -11.9  -7.5  -8.0
Consumption  -5.8  -14.7  .7.1  5.2
Private  -6.7  -16.6  -8.7  5.8
Public  -1.0  0.2  1.0  0.8.
Gross  Fixed Lnvestment  -8.8  -10.6  -8.3  -8.0
Invetories  1/  -0.4  -5.0  0.3  -5.0
Foreip  Balance 1/  2.5  5.0  -1.7  -5.0
L/  Contribution to GDP grwth
E =  esimate-27-
Table  3
gminur  and  Polad!  Prnivateco
(O)  Enterim  by Form of Ownehip  -Runry
Dezonoer  -nu r  June  Deceoner
1988  1989  1990  1991
State Enterprises  2,377  2,399  2,409  2,364  2,362
-imired  LIabity  451  4,485  12,159  18,318  30,949
Joint Stock  116  307  518  646  868
Cooperative  6,680  7,076  7,133  7,132.  7,23
Other  U32f  LfI  iM 2.
Total  10,811  15,236  23,257  29.470  42,402
Sources: Sumatzs cklVcetbook  of augr  a  M  Lugra  atOle
Poland  (Number  of Units  - End of Peiod)
1989  1990  1991  90/89(  91I  )
1.  Stae Enteprises  7,337  8,453  8,228  15.2  -2.7
11.  Commercin.  Law Entrises  16,906  , 36,267  53,771  114.5  48.3
1. Treasury  Owned  208  248  376  19.7-  51.6
2.  oint Venars  429  1,645  4,796  283.4  191.6
3.  Privte  Sector (incorporated)  11,693  29,650  45.077  153.6  52.0
4.  Other Enterprisee  4,576  4,724  3,522  3.2  -25.4
IU.  SmaU  Foreign  Enterpise (Polonia)  841  862  787  2.5.  -8.7
IV.  Coope  s  15,024  16.650  17,374  10.8  4.3
V.  Establishmens  of which.
Social  Organizations  a.L  1,722  1,294  naL  -24.9
Foundations  85  175  158  105.9  -9.7
Religious  n.,  59  198  u.a  235.6
VI.  Individual  Business  (uninorprated)  813,500  1,135,00  1,420,000  39.6  25.1
Source: Central  Statistc  Office
includes  municipal  enerpries  and JSCs owned  by State  Entepises
()  PbOl*d: Shares in GDP and Employment
1989  1990  1991'
Ptivae  Sectr  5ba  =-
Gross  Domesic Produce  28.4  34.7  37-39
(fomer privae sector)  118.11  [24.21  UZa.
GDP growth rate  La.  7.1  0-3
(former privte  sector),  nLL  17.5  t5-71
Employment:  ic. prive  agriculture  47.2  49.9  53-55
excl. private  agriculture  31.1  33.6  38-40
External  Trade: Total Trade  tLa.  8.6  32.9
Exports  naL  4.9  19.8
Imporns  La.  14.4  46.1
[nvesument  35.3  41.3  4143
Production Industrv  16.2  17.4  24.2
(former private sector)  La.  (11.61  (18.41
Construction  33.4  30.6  55.2
(fonm  prive  secor)  [30.01  (30.61  (50.21
Trade  59.5  63.7  75.0
Transpott  6.8  9.9  12.0
Prooete  - 3UDrs Un  bnczem rerew  tOm  usmoa  or "oiiner prnvae sector ,  MxcluOMn  cooperatve
and eabliinu  '  Basd on ca m  I  prices of 1984. Somot= ContmL  StisticaL Offi-28-
TabLe  4
HUNGARY:  sectoral  indices  on  a  quarterly  basis  1989.1  - 1990.1V
Mining  Electric Metal Engineer  Building  Chemical Light  Food  Total
output  89.9  93.3  74.3  98.0  98.3  91.4  90.7  131.0  97.1
Total  sates  87.8  91.4  75.5  105.2  99.4  93.0  95.3  120.1  97.5
Domestic sales  n.a  n.a  69.4  103.2  n.a  88.8  86.5  113.8  93.9
Foreign  sales  n.a  n.a  91.3  107.9  n.a  105.8  128.4  145.7  108.9
Productivity  121.9  91.0  98.7  114.8  106.4  96.9  106.5  134.4  111.8
Enployment  73.8  102.5  75.3  85.3  92.3  94.4  85.1  97.5  86.9
Product wages  117.3  138.8  129.0  134.7  128.0  126.6  121.1  144.6  128.7
Consumer  wages  126.3  146.1  128.2  117.4  126.2  134.7  112.3  137.9  126.1
Producer prices  158.2  151.4  143.3  125.8  142.0  153.9  133.8  137.6  141.2
Relative  prices  111.4  106.9  101.6  89.2  100.6  108.8  94.9  97.6  100.0
Credit  stock  83.6  n.a  84.5  87.0  130.1  89.9  101.9  124.4  96.5
HUNGARY:  sectoral  indices  on  a  quarterly  basis  1989.1  - 1991.1V
Mining  Electric Metal  Engineer  Suilding  Chemical Light  Food  Total
Output  69.8  83.0  40.1  58.0  59.5  66.1  61.3  110.8  70.0
Total  sales  65.9  81.9  40.5  60.2  61.0  70.5  62.2  105.4  70.8
Domestic  sates  n.e  n.a  32.8  57.8  n.a  67.5  54.3  96.5  67.5
Foreign  sales  n.a  n.a  60.4  63.4  n.a  79.8  91.8  141.6  81.1
Productivity  110.1  88.4  67.7  85.8  80.1  77.9  86.3  124.9  96.1
Employment  63.4  94.0  59.1  67.8  74.0  85.0  71.1  88.8  72.9
Product  wages  97.6  144.9  119.7  123.0  123.4  119.8  115.6  148.1  126.0
Consumer  wages  102.7  132.0  110.2  109.1  120.2  124.5  102.0  124.6  115.1
Producer  prices  201.5  174.7  176.6  170.1  187.0  199.3  169.3  161.4  175.2
Relative  prices  115.0  99.7  100.8  97.1  106.7  113.8  96.6  92.1  100.0
Credit  stock  119.9  n.e  65.7  62.6  141.0  102.3  93.7  139.6  99.1Table  5
Polan
Poland:  sectoral  data  1990-91.  percentage  changes  ovef  previous  year
1990  1991
,,,.  _  . ........  ............................  ...  ...  ......  . ....  ...........  ...  ..  . _.........
out  p  employment  wages  prices  outpuA employment  wages  prices
__  . ...  ...........  . ..........  ....  . ..  . . ...  _._...-  ---
Coal  -31.8%  -11.4%  341.3%  898.6%  -0.1%  -8.9%  77.0%  111.1%
Fuel  -20.1%  -0.4%  427.9%  899.5%  -16.3%  -1.9%  61.9%  67.2%
Enw.gy  -9.7%  1.7%  370.1%  978.0%  -6.0%  0.8%  74.2%  a.38%
lronlsteel  -17.1%  -5.6%  419.6%  7833%  -24.2%  -6.6%  59.J%  19.2%
Non-ferrous  materials  -23.7%  -2.8%  407.6%  810.5%  -21.2%  -10.3%  59.7%  22.7%
Meald  -25.6%  -11.4%  370.0%  595.2%  -16.4%  ;  -3.1%  66.2%  33.5%
Machinery  -19.6%  -10.3%  376.7%  543.5%  -22.0%  -9.6%  69.8%  36.3%
Precision  Instruments  -16.1%  -8.6%  357.1%  425.8%  -30.6%  -17.8%  7e2%  28.0%
Transportation  means  -25.2%  -8.1%  377.9%  614.3%  -39.5%  -12.0%  60.6%  53.8%
Elctronks  -20.2%  -7.7%  356.0%  504.0%  -21.9%  -17.2%  74.3%  27.0%c
ChemIcals  -24.6%  -9.0%  374.7%  676.0%  -16.2%  -6.3%  71.1%  42.1%
Constructlon  materials  -20.0%  -5.4%  370.8%  655.7%  a8.6%  -1.5%  74.3%  44.1%
Glass  products  -27.3%  -6.5%  366.2%  597.6%  -5.2%  -6.4%  72.1%  44.0%
Poltery/chIlna  -21.6%  -2.9%  365.0%  510.1%  -14.6%  .8.3%  70.3%  51.1%
Wood  -25.2%  -14.5%  359.6%  5I 1.0%  -5.6%  7.9%  69.8%  53.8%
Paper  -23.8%  -8.5%  371.1%  666.9%  -2.7%  -4.7%  72.7%  20.8%
Textles  -39.6%  -11.2%  329.8%  408.3%  -19.8%  -20.0%  74.6%  30.5%
Wearing  apparel  -24.0%  -14.5%  331.9%  341.4%  -143%  -3.6%  74.3%  45.9%
Leather  -30.6%  -11.0%  319.8%  397.7%  -20.9%  -11.7%  74.6%  38.8%
Food  -23.7%  -2.5%  359.2%  528.0%  .13%  5.1%  72.5%  52.6%
..  __  _  ._  ......  . ......  _...........  .......  . ....  . _._  ........  ..  .__  ..  ......  __..__  ...  ...  ._ .....  _.__  .....  . ....  ....  ._._..._
Average  -23.5%  -7.5%  368.0%  61713%  -15.4%  -6.8%  70.3%  45.6%
Standard  deviation  6.1%  4.4%  26.8%  175.5%  10.0%  7.0%  5.5%  22.2%
CoefficIent  of variation  -26.0%  -57.9%  7.3%  28.4%  -64.9%  -102.9%  7.8%  48.7%
Saourc:  Central  Slatlstical  Oftlce, SatIscI  ulinW (Warsaw,  1991  and  19921.-30-
Table 6: Inventories
Poland
1989  19S2O  15221'
Total inventories in
months of sales  2.9  2.1  2.0
Share of Finished Goods Inventory in Total SaWes
Total  3.7%  3.4%  3.9
Excluding food sector  1.8%  2.7%  n.a.
Finished goods inventory in days of sales'
Total  F3.0  12.0  14.0
Excluding food sector  6.0  10.0  n.a.
Shares of total inventory 2
1989  1990  1991
Finished  Other  Finished  Other  Finished  Other
Total  14%  86%  13%  82%  16%  84%
Food sector  41%  59%  36%  74%  n.a.  n.a.
November
2  In Industry
Hungary
Total inventories in
months of sales  2.4  2.4  3.5
Share of Finished Goods Inventory in Total Sales
Toti  4.8%  4.9%  7.7%
EDxcluding  food sector  4.4%  4.2%  7.0%
Finished goods inventory in days of sales
Total  17.0  18.0  28.0
Excluding  food sector  16.0  15.0  25.0
Shares of total inventory
1989  1990  1991
Finished  Other  Finished  Other  Finished  Other
Total  24%  76%  25.5%  74.5%  27%  73%
Food sector  30%  70%  34%  66%  34%  66%-31-
Table 7:  Trade Indicators  1990 and  1991 (percege  changes)
H-
1990  1991k
Volume  Unit Value  Volume  Unit Value
Non-R-ouble
Imports  2.8  8.7
Exports  9.5  6.8
Rouble,
Imports  -17.8  13.6
Exports  -26.1  10.1
Total Trade
Imports  -5.0  11.1  7.1  24.7




Total  0.3  -9.3









Exports  40.5  -7.5
Rouble
Imports  -34.1  33.6
Exports  -13.3  -41.8
otal Trade
Imports  -17.9  39.0
Exports  13.7  -1.4
Terms gf Trade
Total  -17.2  4.8Table 8
Poland:  Sectoral  data  on external  trade 1/
....---------  -...  ---------------  ..  . ,.  . ,_.  ...................  . ......... _  ._,...  - -..  ._  -----  -...---
CMEA-Export  CMEA  Trade  Total  Trade  Change  in Sales  Ratio  effect  effect  real  sales
1990  1991  1991  1991
Electro-machinery  18.0%  -6.9%  -18.9%  -26.1% Fuel  and  energy  1.7%  4.2%  -3.1%  -8.4% Metallurgy  2.4%  1.5%  11.3%  -22.4% Chemical  6.0%  -3.3%  -13.6%  -15.2% Mineral  0.6%  0.3%  -7.4%  -8.0% Wood  and  paper  0.6%h  0.2%  5.5%  -4.6% Light  4.4%  -1.1%  -7.5%  -18.6% Food  0.7%  0.6%  -9.5%  -0.5%
Source:  Polish  Monthly  Bulletin  on foreign  trade
1  / data  for 1991  cover  the  period  January-July
Trade  effect=  contribution  of  change  in real  exports  and  imports  to change  in sales-33--
Chart  1
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Hungary: Real Money  / Credit Aggregates
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Poland: Enterprise  Profitability
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